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FROM KILLER WEED TO DROP-OUT DRUG: THE CHANGING 
IDEOLOGY OF MARIHUANA 
JEROME L. HIMMELSTEIN 
A major change occurred in the dangers attributed to marihuana use in the 
mid-1960s in the United States: What had once been regarded as a "Killer 
Weed" became seen as a "Drop-out Drug." Lost amid the loud debates over 
the legality and morality of  marihuana use, this change has rarely been 
noticed or studied; nonetheless, it is important,  for it involves a major shift 
in how the public discussion of marihuana was framed - a shift that was 
symptomatic of  other important social changes of  the time. 
From the 1930s to the mid-1960s, marihuana was primarily characterized 
as a "Killer Weed," a drug that made its users violent, criminal, and aggres- 
sive. Writing shortly after the passage of  the Marihuana Tax Act of  1937, 
anti-drug crusaders Earle and Robert Rowell put it this way: "While opium 
kills ambition and deadens initiative, marihuana incites to immorality and 
crime" [ 1 ]. 
In the turbulent debate over marihuana beginning in the 1960s, the Killer 
Weed claim was abruptly replaced by the virtually opposite assertion that 
marihuana induced passivity and destroyed motivation. What the Rowells 
had once said about opium in the 1930s in contrast to marihuana now was 
said about marihuana itself: it killed ambition and deadened initiative; it 
created an "amotivational syndrome";  it was a "Drop-out Drug." Thus, in 
summarizing the drug's effects, Time Magazine argued in 1965 that 
marihuana "affects users' judgment  and if used daily will dull a student's 
initiative"; and Benjamin Spock, the pediatrician and political activist, noted 
that "a small percentage of  users, the 'potheads, '  make its frequent use the 
focus of  their existence and lose some of  their ambition and aim" [2].  
The shift from Killer Weed to Drop-out Drug involved a change not only 
in the specific dangers attributed to marihuana use but also (and more 
importantly) in the general image of the drug and its users. It thus entails 
nothing less than a transformation of  the assumptions underlying public 
discussion of  marihuana. 
In what follows, I shall document  and explain this radical shift in the 
image of  marihuana. I shall show that a Killer Weed image came to dominate 
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and frame discussion of  marihuana in the mid-1930s and that this image was 
replaced by that of  a Drop-out Drug in the 1960s. I shall also argue that the 
transformation of  Killer Weed to Drop-out Drug resulted from changes in 
three crucial social factors - the array of  organized political actors in the 
drug-control arena, the perceived social background of  marihuana users, and 
the symbolic meaning of the drug. In doing so, I shall draw upon three 
important  guiding concepts in recent drug control literature: What I shall call 
"entrepreneurship," "social locus," and "symbolic politics." 
The present study is thus concerned with ideology in the broadest sense: 
ideas considered in the context  of  social action. It seeks to identify the 
socially dominant  conceptual frameworks within which marihuana was dis- 
cussed at various times and to determine the social structural factors that 
shaped these frameworks. It examines the kinds of  dangers imputed to 
marihuana and the extent  to which these imputed dangers provided a basis 
for an overall image of drug and user. 
Previous sociological and historical work, in contrast, has focused primari- 
ly on changes in marihuana laws, especially the passage of  the Marihuana Tax 
Act in 1937 and the debate over law reform in the late 1960s and the 1970s 
[3].  Although this work has also been concerned with changing assessments 
of how dangerous marihuana is, it has paid considerably less attention to the 
specific dangers at t r ibuted to marihuana or the general image of the drug. 
When these have received attention, it has been for debunking, not under- 
standing. Bonnie and Whitebread are virtually alone in noting the prevalence 
of  the violence claim in earlier discussions of  marihuana and the shift to an 
emphasis on "psychological dependence, amotivation, and alienation" in the 
1960s [4].  
This study of marihuana ideology also seeks to make several basic points 
about ideology in general. First, it is structured and selective; that is, it is 
organized into "persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and 
presentation, of  selection, emphasis, and exclusion" [5].  We shall see that 
the ideology of marihuana at any given time was not a haphazard collection 
of observations and beliefs but was organized around a coherent  set of  
assumptions about the drug and its users. 
Second, the cognitive framework of  ideology is socially determined; that 
is, the specific ways in which ideology is structured or framed in turn are 
shaped by or fit with other  important  features of social structure. We shall 
see that the images of marihuana that structure the discussion of the drug at 
any specific time were themselves social constructions. 
Finally, explaining a set of  publicly accepted beliefs sociologically does 
not necessarily mean explaining them away or proving them false. What a 
sociological account implies, instead, is that the truth-value of a belief is 
not the crucial factor in its acceptance in public discussion. We shall see that 
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both the Killer Weed and the Drop-out Drug images became prominent in 
the absence of  logically compelling evidence and that the social milieus in 
which they arose were predisposed in their favor. 
Guiding Concepts 
Several social structural features that are likely to influence the image of  
marihuana can be gathered from the literature on drug controls that has 
developed in the last two decades. This literature has formulated numerous 
sociological explanations of  drug controls, but three "guiding concepts" seem 
especially important - "entrepreneurship," "social locus," and "symbolic 
politics." These notions appear either individually or in various combinations 
in much of the drug literature; their classic formulations, however, can be 
found in the work of  Howard Becker, Troy Duster, and Joseph Gusfield 
respectively [6].  By briefly examining these three works, we can identify 
the three guiding concepts and then redirect them from the study of  drug 
controls to the somewhat different issue of marihuana ideology. 
ENTREPRENEURSt t IP  
To understand drug controls, Becker urges us to pay attention to what 
organizations or organized social groups took the initiative to procure a 
particular drug law and how and why they did so. Moral rules, Becker 
reminds us, are not  automatically created and enforced. Rule creation and 
enforcement require "moral enterprise," the specific effort by a formally 
consti tuted agent to transform established social values into specific rules 
and then to see to it that these rules are applied. Such an agent is a "moral 
entrepreneur." 
Whenever rules are created and applied, we should be alive to the  possible presence o f  an enter- 
prising individual or group. Their activities can properly be called moral enterprise, for what 
they  are enterprising about  is the  creation o f  a new fragment  of  the  moral  const i tu t ion of  society, 
its code o f  right and wrong [7].  
To procure a new moral rule, the moral entrepreneur must go through a 
characteristic process of  publicizing the area of  wrongdoing, enlisting 
organizational support,  cultivating public opinion, and so on - a process that 
Becker traces in the case of  the U.S. Federal Bureau of  Narcotics and the 
Marihuana Tax Act. 
To be sure, the role of  entrepreneurship in the creation of  drug laws is 
considerably more complex than Becker pictures it; there may be any 
number of  moral (and presumably amoral) entrepreneurs contending to 
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define the moral and legal status of  a drug, and at different times different 
groups may show an interest in the social fate of  a particular drug. In 
addition, although Becker takes for granted the ability and the willingness of 
a specific entrepreneur to create legislation regarding a specific drug (e.g., 
the Federal Bureau of  Narcotics' ability and desire to direct the creation of 
the Marihuana Tax Act), these are in fact problematic. The power and 
interest of  a specific entrepreneur depends on a variety of  historical 
contingencies: the importance of  the issue, the social status of  the drug 
users, and the presence of other interested groups. 
With these qualifications in mind, we can transfer the notion of  entre- 
preneurship from the study of  drug controls to the study drug ideology; 
organized social actors play a role not only in creating drug laws but also in 
developing, publicizing, and legitimating specific images of a drug. One key 
to the changing image of  marihuana thus may be what moral entrepreneurs 
are available at various times to lend credibility and authori ty to particular 
images of the drug. In particular, we shall see that the rise of the Killer Weed 
image in the 1930s was tied to the dominance of  public discussion of 
marihuana by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, and the replacement of  this 
image by the Drop-out Drug image in the 1960s reflected the demise of that 
dominance. 
SOCIAL LOCUS 
In contrast to the focus of  "entrepreneurship" on who creates the rules, 
the notion that I shall call "social locus" directs our attention to who uses 
a drug. As developed by Duster, it posits a relationship between the moral 
and legal status of  a particular kind of  drug use and the social position of the 
groups identified as the primary or typical users; the lower the social posi- 
tion of the users, the more likely that use will be regarded as deviant, dis- 
reputable, and wrong. As the social location of  use changes, so does its moral 
status. In Duster's words: 
certain classes of  persons in any society are more  susceptible to being charged with moral  interiori- 
ty than  other  classes o f  persons. The behavior in which persons indulge is of ten  less impor tant  than  
the  social category from which they come . . . When it is part  of  the  public view that  the  pre- 
dominan t  perpetrators  o f  the  act come f rom the moral  center, the  act cannot  long remain "im- 
moral '  or deviant;  it can become deviant again only under  circumstances where the  public concep- 
t ion is tha t  the  ~morally susceptible'  classes are those  who are the  primary indulgers [ 8 ].  
Duster cites the moral careers of  opiate and alcohol use in the U.S. as 
examples. Up to the early 1900s, when opiate (primarily morphine)users  
were predominantly from the upper and middle strata (the "decent  and 
respectable elements"),  opiate addiction was regarded as an unfor tunate  
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malady, but not as inherently morally depraved or stigmatizing. In the late 
1910s, when the peculiar restrictions of the 1914 Harrison Act made use by 
the lower strata (the "~unrespectable elements") more visible than that of  the 
higher strata, the moral status of  opiate use changed: it was now seen as in- 
herently depraved and sick. Alcohol use, in contrast, made the opposite 
journey: in the early 1900s, alcohol use was associated with the lower strata 
and thus was regarded as deviant. With the advent of  Prohibition, which 
unlike the Harrison Act left no quasi-legal loopholes for the upper and 
middle strata, the (illicit) alcohol use of  more respectable elements of society 
became publicly visible, "producing the conditions for a public reappraisal 
of  the moral status of alcoholic consumption" [9].  
The notion of "social locus" may be applicable to the specific claims 
made about drugs as well as to their general moral status. The public image 
of  a drug and its effects depends in part on the social groups perceived as 
primary users and on the public stereotypes about these groups and about 
the typical ways in which they are deviant. In regard to marihuana, we shall 
see that the Killer Weed image developed in part because the drug's original 
perceived users were Mexican laborers and other lower-strata groups, who 
were publicly stereotyped as violent. This image persisted until the perceived 
user group decisively shifted to middle-class youth  in the 1960s, whose 
expected types of  deviance were quite different. 
SYMBOLIC POLITICS 
The concept of  ~symbolic politics" as presented by Gusfield understands 
drugs and drug controls as symbolic counters in wider social conflicts: at 
times of social conflict or stress, the drug use of  a socially subordinate or 
insurgent group may become a symbol of  the threat that this group poses to 
a relatively dominant or established social group or to the dominant social 
order. Legislation against drug use may thus become a way of  reasserting the 
legitimacy of  the existing social hierarchy and the hegemony of dominant 
social groups by symbolically condemning those groups which threaten that 
hierarchy and hegemony. 
The alcohol prohibition movement  in the U.S., Gusfield argues, is the 
prime example of this kind of  symbolic politics. In the late nineteenth 
century, the Temperance Movement turned from ~assimilative reform," an 
at tempt to save individual drunkards, to "coercive reform," an effort to 
procure state and, ultimately, national legislation against the production and 
sale of  alcohol. The new emphasis reflected the effort of  a predominantly 
Protestant, native-born, rural, old middle class to reassert its social position 
in the face of a rising urban, corporate capitalist, industrial society and a 
growing Catholic immigrant working class. Prohibition was a symbolic asser- 
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tion of  the dominance of  abstemious old middle class norms concerning 
alcohol use and of  the old middle-class culture in general over more per- 
missive alcohol norms and the new culture and classes that these norms 
symbolized: "The Eighteenth Amendment  was the high point of  the struggle 
to assert the public dominance of  old middle-class values. It established the 
victory of  Protestant over Catholic, rural over urban, tradition over moderni- 
ty, the middle class over both  the lower and upper strata" [ 10]. 
As with the other  two concepts, "symbolic  politics" may prove useful in 
understanding drug ideology as well as drug controls. The dominant image of  
a drug may be shaped partly by the substance's role as a symbol in wider 
social conflict. In the case of  marihuana, we shall see that the rise of  the 
Drop-out Drug image and the notion of  the "amotivational syndrome" can 
be linked to the drug's role as a symbol of  the political and cultural rebellion 
of  middle-class you th  in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
Methodology 
In the following discussion, we shall be interested in describing and 
explaining changes in the dominant image of  marihuana in public discourse 
in the United States. Public discourse refers not to popular opinion (as 
reflected in survey research, for example) but  rather to discussions of  
marihuana formally "open to common or general view" - in particular, 
what was said about  the drug in hearings, periodicals, newspapers, and so on. 
Two systematic samples of  such materials were examined. The first 
consisted of  periodical articles on marihuana indexed in the Readers' Guide 
to Periodical Literature. The Readers'  Guide indexes articles by topic from 
a selection of  general-interest periodicals. It covers a broad time span (1890 
to the present), provides a presorted sample of  articles on marihuana, and 
maintains a general consistency in the kind of  periodicals indexed through- 
out  the period under study. The sample was drawn from the "marihuana," 
"hashish," "cannabis," and "THC" categories in the Readers' Guide from 
1890 to 1976. It consisted of  all articles in these categories from 1890 to 
1966 (N = 56), and a random selection of  one-fifth of  the articles from 1967 
to 1976 (N = 65). A limited selection of  articles after 1966 was required by 
the sharply increased frequency of  articles at the time. 
The second sample of  materials included all Congressional hearings and 
Federal reports that discussed marihuana from the early 1900s through 
1976. The list was compiled from the major historical works on American 
drug controls and from several anthologies [111. The reports included, 
among others, the 1931 Wickersham Commission volume on "Crime and the 
Foreign Born," the various inquiries into drug use commissioned by 
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President Kennedy in the early 1960s, the 1972 marihuana report of  the 
National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, and the annual assess- 
ments of  "Marihuana and Health" by the National Institute on Drug Abuse. 
The hearings included the 1937 House and Senate hearings on the Marihuana 
Tax Act, the various hearings in the 1950s on narcotics and organized crime, 
and the rash of  drug hearings in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
A variety of  additional primary materials was also used - the official 
annual reports of  federal narcotics authorities (Traffic in Opium and Other 
Dangerous Drugs), the 1945 report of  the New York Mayor's Commission on 
Marihuana (the LaGuardia Report) ,  and a sampling of  books and newspaper 
articles. 
A general reading of  these materials was supplemented by a systematic 
quantitative content  analysis of  the Readers' Guide sample. Each article was 
coded for the effects it imputed to marihuana use to allow us to determine 
the prevalence of  various claims at different time periods. 
Killer Weed: Failure of  Restraint 
VIOLENCE 
From the mid-1930s to the early 1960s, marihuana was characterized in 
public discussion primarily as a Killer Weed. Although the drug was said 
to produce a myriad of  effects and was sometimes condemned as unpredict- 
able in this regard, violence was the main adverse effect claimed for use: 
Marihuana was said to destroy users' internal controls, stimulate their aggres- 
sive drives, and lead them to assault, murder, rape, or self-destruction. The 
drug was believed to release a fundamentally destructive human nature and 
thus cause a failure of restraint. 
The violence claim was central to the arguments made by narcotics 
officials against the drug. In one of  its first detailed descriptions of  the 
effects of  marihuana [12],  the Federal Bureau of  Narcotics (FBN) 
enumerated the drug's various effects on consciousness - euphoria, stimula- 
tion of  the imagination, kaleidoscopic visions, distortions of  time and space 
perception - a n d  then argued: 
The principal effect of  the  drug is upon  the mind  which seems to lose the power o f  directing and 
controlling thought .  Its cont inued use produces pronounced  menta l  deterioration in many  cases. 
Its more  immediate  effect apparently is to remove the normal  inhibit ions of  the  individual and 
release any antisocial tendencies which may  be present. Those who indulge in its habi tual  use 
eventually develop a delirious rage after its administrat ion,  during which t ime they are, temporarily 
at least, irresponsible and prone to commit  violent crimes [13] .  
While mental deterioration received no further attention, the violence theme 
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was supported by quotes from appropriate authorities and by examples of 
"marihuana crimes" [ 141. 
Similarly in a 1937 American Magazine article, FBN Commissioner Harry 
Anslinger stressed the violence theme, arguing that marihuana "addicts may 
often develop a delirious rage during which they are temporarily and violent- 
ly insane; . . . this insanity may take the form of a desire for self-destruction 
or a persecution complex to be satisfied only by the commission of some 
heinous crime" [15]. Anslinger spent much of the article supporting this 
violence claim with more examples of marihuana-induced crimes. 
Up through the early 1960s, the FBN's annual reports continued to list 
spectacular examples of marihuana crimes and, even as late as 1966, the 
Bureau stressed the violence theme. At the 1966 Senate Judiciary 
Committee hearings on the Narcotic Rehabilitation Act, Bureau 
Commissioner Henry Giordano, who had succeeded Anslinger four years 
previously, summarized the dangers of marihuana as follows: 
From my  studies and experience, one theme  emerges - that  mar ihuana  is capable o f  inducing 
acts of  violence, even murder .  The drug frees the  unconsc ious  tendencies of  the  individual user, 
the result being reflected in f requent  quarrels, fights, and assaults [16] • 
The violence claim also dominated the 1937 Congressional hearings on the 
Marihuana Tax Act, the most extensive public discussion of marihuana 
prior to the 1960s. At the hearings before the House Ways and Means Com- 
mittee (which were substantially longer and more complete than the very 
brief hearings before the Senate Finance Committee), representatives of the 
FBN again stressed that marihuana use stimulated violent behavior by 
dissolving moral restraints, destroying the ability to judge right and wrong, 
stimulating grandiose fantasies, and making the user highly suggestible. 
Violence was also the central theme of the three articles and of two of the 
four letters submitted as exhibits to the committee. No other allegation 
received even a fraction of that attention [ 171. 
Periodical articles from the mid-1930s to the early 1960s also focused on 
the violence theme. Between 1935 and 1940, the period of most intensive 
attention given to marihuana, 85% of the twenty Readers' Guide articles 
that discussed specific effects at all mentioned violence; between 1935 and 
1963, 63% of the 35 articles that addressed the issue did. In contrast, only a 
few articles mentioned addiction, passivity, stepping-stone, accidents, sexual 
debauchery, or other specific effects. More importantly, violence was 
virtually the only theme that received detailed attention. The claim that 
marihuana stimulated aggression was discussed at length and was buttressed 
by various legends and alleged cases of marihuana-induced crime. 
We cannot adequately appreciate the importance of the violence claim in 
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public discussion of  marihuana, however, simply by noting the frequency 
and extent  of  references to it. Violence was not simply quantitatively pre- 
dominant; it also was central to the images of  user and drug and thus 
provided a framework for the entire discussion. It was seen not  simply as 
the major effect of  marihuana use but  as the essential characteristic of  the 
user as well. Especially during the late 1930s, when periodicals described the. 
user, they pictured either a violent fiend or an innocent victim turned 
violent fiend; marihuana users were "criminals, degenerates, maniacs" in 
the words of  Survey Graphic and Forum and Century [ 18 ]. 
The violence claim also was a way of  conceptually organizing and under- 
standing the many other effects imputed to marihuana. Each was seen 
primarily as a way in which marihuana made the user violent and thus 
carried connotations of  crime and aggression. As the 1936 FBN report put  
it~ marihuana use generated violence by removing normal inhibitions and 
releasing antisocial tendencies. This twin theme of  irresistible impulses and 
destruction of  the will was repeated frequently in periodical articles [19].  
Anslinger's 1937 article linked violence to insanity and to a persecution 
complex. The latter in turn was said by  others to arise from the delusions 
and hallucinations brought on by the drug; those not subject to delusions of  
persecution might be prone to "acute erotic visions," which would lead 
them to commit forcible rape [20].  
When viewed from the perspective of  the Killer Weed image, even the 
most elementary effects of  marihuana on consciousness took on a sinister 
cast. Simple distortions of  time and space perception and disturbances of  
connected thought were said to confuse the mind in such a way that the 
"slightest impulse or suggestion carries it away" [21].  Heightened suggestibi- 
lity itself was also regarded as a cause of  violence, because it was used by 
"leaders of  gangs and criminals" to lure the innocent into crime [22].  
In short, nearly every other effect imputed to marihuana was implicated 
in the drug's violence-producing tendency and interpreted accordingly. The 
Killer Weed image tied these disparate effects together and gave them 
coherence. What we are dealing with, then, is not merely a specific claim 
about marihuana but  a general image of  drug and user that oriented public 
discussion. 
Having shown the centrality of  the Killer Weed image to the discussion of  
marihuana from the 1930s onward, we can turn to the question of  how it 
got to be that way. We can explain its predominance by tracing its history 
and examining especially the initial social locus of  marihuana use and the 
entrepreneurial activity of  the Federal Bureau of  Narcotics. 
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MEXICANS AND MARIHUANA 
Prior to the 1930s, among those few who considered the issue, there was 
no consistent nationwide image of  marihuana use and the problems it 
caused. The seven articles in the Reader's Guide between 1890 and 1931 
show little agreement on how dangerous marihuana was, what its major 
effects were, or even what name to call it. The last of  these is particularly 
interesting; by t h e  mid-1930s, the drug would be generally known as 
"marihuana," but  until then it had several identities. As a medical prepara- 
tion and an object  of  scientific interest, it was "cannabis"; as an intoxicant 
found in Mexico and along the Texas border, it was "marihuana";  and as an 
Eastern drug idcntified with Arabs and Indians, it was "hashish °, or "Indian 
Hemp."  The multiplicity of  terms implies that the drug had no settled social 
image. 
The very fact that the drug ul t imately became known as "marihuana" in 
the 1930s suggests that the social image that became dominant then had 
roots in the Southwest.  lndeed, this appears to be the case. Marihuana nse 
was first introduced into the U.S. on a significant scale in the 1910s by 
immigrant Mexican laborers in the Southwest,  from where it spread 
principally to various lower strata groups in New Orleans in the 1920s [23].  
In both these places an image of  marihuana - tying together the  drug, 
violence, and Mexican laborers and other lower-class groups - developed 
along with the diffusion of  use. 
Marihuana use was hardly a big issue in the Southwest  at the time, but  the 
attention it did receive came in the context  o f  specific anti-Mexican stereo- 
types. Mexican laborers were often perceived as "criminal types,"  noted for 
carrying knives and being drunk and disorderly; marihuana was clearly 
associated with Mexican laborers. As a result, marihuana also became 
associated with violence. It became a Killer Weed. 
The idea that marihuana use made Mexican laborers violent was well 
established among upper-strata Mexicans in both  Mexico and the U.S. in 
the early 1900s [24].  As Mexican laborers moved through the Southwest  
to take the cheap agricultural jobs  available from Texas to California and 
further north, they brought marihuana and the Mexican laborer-mari-  
huana-violence  image with them. The stereotype was pointedly presented 
as early as 1913 in a Cosmopolitan short story by  Alfred Lewis, Hearst 
reporter and well-known writer on the Southwest° The story concerns the 
ill-fated adventures of  an errant Harvard graduate who is attracted to 
Mexicans and marihuana in a border town and ultimately becomes so violent 
that be must be killed in self-defense. Lewis's narrator makes it quite clear 
that Mexicans are typically violent and useless except to "shoot  at when 
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you wants to unload an' clean your gun," that marihuana is a Mexican drug, 
and that marihuana induces violence: "Once old marihuana wrops its tail 
about your intellects, you becomes voylent an' blood-hungry, an' goes on 
the onaccountable war-path, mighty deemoniac" [25]. 
This image of marihuana as a Killer Weed was common whenever the drug 
was discussed in the Southwest in the 1910s and 1920s. Reports on mari- 
huana by the Department of Agriculture in 1917 and by U.S. Canal Zone 
authorities in 1925 cite numerous accounts by law enforcement officials and 
newspapers regarding the connections between marihuana, Mexicans, and 
violence. The brief legislative discussions that preceded the passage of anti- 
marihuana legislation in numerous southwestern and western states often 
made pointed references to the drug's Mexican origins and violent effects. 
California crime studies in the 1920s noted the high rates of crime and 
delinquency among Mexicans, and the state's narcotics reports identified 
marihuana as a Mexican drug [26]. 
The perception of marihuana as a Killer Weed developed also in New 
Orleans in the 1920s in connection with use by various lower-strata groups. 
At several times in the 1920s and early 1930s, marihuana use was a greater 
public issue there than anywhere else in America at the time. In 1920, 
Louisiana Governor John Parker, alerted to the dangers of marihuana by the 
president of the Louisiana Board of Health, wrote the Prohibition Commis- 
sioner that the drug made people go "crazy and wild" [27]. The New 
Orleans police staged a major crackdown on "marihuana and vice" in 1926, 
which was prominently reported by the local press [28]. 
New Orleans public officials and private citizens wrote several articles in 
the early 1930s describing the evils of the drug - articles that would be fre- 
quently cited directly and indirectly in subsequent years [29]. The authors 
agreed that marihuana made the user violent. Indeed, their perceptions are 
summed up neatly by the title of Eugene Stanley's article: "Marihuana as a 
Developer of Criminals." Both Stanley and A.E. Fossier, whose articles were 
nearly identical, described the users simply as of the ~'crirninal class." Frank 
Gomila and Madeline Lambou asserted that marihuana dealers were 
"Mexicans, Italians, Spanish-Americans, drifters from ships" and that users 
included dock workers and sailors, Negroes ("Practically every Negro in the 
city can give a reasonable description of the drug's effects"), Mexicans, and 
"vicious characters." The New Orleans image of marihuana and violence, 
in short, developed in tandem with a perception of the users as either 
members of racial minorities or as lower- and working-class whites. 
In the early 1930s, the New Orleans-Southwest image of marihuana use 
found its way into the discourse of federal law enforcement officials and 
from there into general public discussion. Prior to that time, marihuana 
received scant federal attention; and, when the drug was discussed (as in a 
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1929 Surgeon General's report and a law establishing "narcotics farms" for 
treating addicts), it was called "Indian Hemp" and not regarded primarily as 
a Killer Weed. In contrast, the New Orleans-Southwest image of marihuana 
was reflected (but not consistently endorsed)in the 1931 Wickersham Com- 
mission Report on "Crime and the Foreign Born," which paid considerable 
attention to the fact that Mexicans, unlike most foreign-born groups, had 
higher official crime rates than native-born whites. While concluding that 
the high rates were rooted in discrimination, social conditions, and cultural 
differences, it documented at some length the belief of judges and police 
officials in areas with high Mexican populations that Mexicans were inherent- 
ly violent. The Report also noted that Mexicans Were tied closely to drug 
use and described marihuana as a "drug the use of which has spread with the 
dispersion of Mexican immigrants" and "is widespread throughout Southern 
California among the Mexican population." Finally, it described marihuana 
as a violent drug in a citation from a publication of the California State 
Narcotics Committee: "if continued, the drug develops a delirious rage, 
causing the smoker to commit atrocious crimes" [30]. 
The New Orleans-Southwest stereotype insinuated itself into the per- 
ceptions of federal narcotics officials as well. The Wickersham study and the 
1917 Department of Agriculture investigation made their way into the 
Bureau's files, and a New Orleans FBN agent forwarded Stanley's article to 
his superiors in Washington [31]. FBN Commissioner Anslinger reported in 
retrospect that his first perceptions of marihuana were based on reports from 
southwestern and western states where there was concern about the behavior 
of Mexicans who, "the sheriffs and local police departments claimed, got 
loaded on the stuff and caused a lot of trouble, stabbings, assaults, and so 
on" [32]. 
It is not surprising, then, that when federal narcotics officials first referred 
to marihuana, they described its users as "Spanish-speaking" and "Latin 
American." Several years later, when the FBN began publicizing the effects 
of the d~ug, it stressed violent crime [33]. Drawing its image of marihuana 
largely from New Orleans and the Southwest, the Bureau simply came to see 
the drug as "obviously" a Killer Weed, a producer of violence and crime. 
THEBUREAU'SHEGEMONY 
When the Bureau began to publicize the "marihuana menace" in late 
1934, it stressed the Killer Weed image, and this image became diffused into 
the general public discussion of marihuana because the Bureau effectively 
dominated this discussion. The public image of marihuana from the mid- 
1930s through the early 1960s was largely what the Bureau dictated; those 
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who wrote or talked about the drug relied heavily on the Bureau and its 
sources. 
The Bureau dominated the Congressional hearings on the Marihuana Tax 
Act; it presented the bulk of the testimony, sponsored most of the other 
significant witnesses, and submitted most of the accompanying materials. In 
doing so, it introduced the Stanley and the Gomila-Lambou articles into 
public discussion and stressed the colorful evidence for marihuana's violence- 
inducing propensity cited by Stanley: several Oriental myths about 
marihuana use and a second-hand report of a New Orleans jail study that 
claimed that one-third of the prisoners were marihuana "addicts." Opposi- 
tion to the Bureau was largely technical or half-hearted. Manufacturers of 
rope, hempseed, and hemp oil were easily convinced that an anti-marihuana 
taw would not interfere with their business, and the American Medical As- 
sociation's complaint that a new drug law meant more redtape for physicians 
got nowhere. 
The Bureau also influenced the content of most periodical articles either 
directly or indirectly. Between 1935 and 1940, for example, besides the one 
article actually co-authored by Anslinger, seven articles explicitly credited 
the Bureau or its commissioner as the source of information [34]. Several 
articles repeated almost verbatim the Old World marihuana legends found in 
Stanley and popularized by Anslinger - that hashish was used by the Islamic 
sect of Assassins to fortify themselves for political murders, that it made the 
Malays run "amok," and that it was the "nepenthe" that Homer said 
"made men forget their homes" [35]. Others cited the Stanley prisoner 
study and the Gomila-Lambou two-fold crime theory that marihuana both 
caused unpremeditated violence and was used by criminals to fortify them- 
selves for premeditated crimes [361. 
Examples of marihuana crimes from Anslinger's 1937 article, moreover, 
were repeated incessantly - the Texas hitchhiker who murdered a motorist, 
the West Virginia man who raped a nine-year-old girl, the Florida youth who 
ax-murdered his family, the Ohio juvenile gang that committed 38 armed 
robberies, the Michigan man who killed a state trooper, and other equally 
blood-curdling tales. In short, discussion of marihuana in the late 1930s drew 
heavily on the Bureau and its favored sources; sixteen of the 22 Readers' 
Guide articles between 1935 and 1940 bear the direct or indirect marks of 
the Bureau. 
Just as periodical articles generally used the information propagated by 
the Bureau, they virtually ignored information that the Bureau ignored. 
Studies by the Indian Hemp Commission in 1894, the U.S. Canal Zone Com- 
mittee in 1926 and 1933, and Walter Bromberg in 1934, all of which 
distinctly downplayed the dangers of marihuana use in general and the 
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violence claim in particular, were rarely mentioned during the period, though 
all were available. 
The Bureau's dominance continued through the 1940s and 1950s and 
even into the 1960s. Its rejection of  the findings of  the 1945 LaGuardia 
Report ,  which again questioned the dangers of  marihuana, was generally 
accepted. Its new claim that marihuana use led to the use of  harder drugs, 
first voiced in its 1949 report, gained common-sense status quickly. In 
hearings on the Boggs Act (to increase penalties for narcotics offenses) two 
years later, it was already regarded as a "tragically familiar s tory" [37] .  
The Bureau's success in dominating public discussion for several decades 
rested on specific social conditions. The Bureau succeeded because 
marihuana use prior to the 1960s was an insignificant issue, because no other 
organized groups had an interest in the fate of  the drug, and because its 
users were socially marginal and few in number. Hardly anyone knew about 
marihuana or had an interest in it. The populace at large hardly knew its 
name; there were few sources of  information other than the Bureau; and the 
declining medical use of  the drug by the 1930s had given manufacturers, 
physicians, and pharmacists only a token interest in opposing the Bureau's 
propaganda. In such circumstances, the Bureau could shape the image of  
marihuana with minimal effort  and with little likelihood of  opposition or 
rebuttal. The paucity and marginality of  the users, moreover, made it 
unlikely that otherwise reputable citizens would be arrested, that non-users 
would have any first-hand experience with users, or that the users themselves 
would effectively organize. The Bureau's hegemony thus was not  disturbed 
by other  interest groups, organized users, or a concerned general public. As 
we shall see, in the 1960s, all this would change. 
SUMMARY 
In short, marihuana became known as a Killer Weed for two reasons. The 
first was its initial social locus of  use. Marihuana was seen as a drug typically 
used by Mexican laborers and other  lower-strata groups; these groups were 
perceived as typically becoming deviant in violent ways. Marihuana thus 
became known as a drug that typically produced violence. This image of  
marihuana developed in the Southwest  and New Orleans and was transmitted 
by local officials and narcotics agents to the relevant authorities in the 
federal government. The second reason was the entrepreneurship of  the 
Federal Bureau of  Narcotics, which dominated public discussion and gave 
the Killer Weed image credibility and legitimacy. Once established, the image 
persisted partly because of  continued FBN publicity, partly because of  
inertia; the more the claim was repeated, the more it was likely to be 
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repeated, until significant social changes rendered the old image obsolete 
and created a new image to replace it. 
The Killer Weed image, moreover, arose and persisted despite a lack of any 
"compelling" evidence for it. Indeed, the only available evidence for the 
violence claim has already been mentioned: a second-hand report of a 
prisoner study, some time-honored Old World legends, and several cases of 
alleged marihuana-related crimes. 
Drop-out Drug: Failure of Achievement 
THE AMOTIVATIONAL SYNDROME 
The Killer Weed image virtually disappeared from public discussion in 
the middle and late t960s. Federal narcotics officials pushed it at the 
Narcotic Rehabilitation Act hearings in 1966 and again at the 1968 House 
hearings on hallucinogen control, but these were the last times any major 
witness mentioned the marihuana-violence connection [38]. The violence 
claim was virtually absent from the numerous lengthy drug control hearings 
of the late 1960s and early 1970s. In its 1972 report on marihuana, the 
National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse concluded flatly 
that "marihuana does not cause violent or aggressive behavior," and even 
Senator James Eastland's 1974 hearings on the "marihuana-hashish epi- 
demic" managed to omit any mention of violence from the almost endless 
list of dangers it attributed to marihuana [39]. The violence claim dis- 
appeared also from periodical articles, and by 1971, narcotics officials had 
abandoned it as well. John Ingersoll, head of the Bureau of Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs, stressed instead that marihuana was "psychologically 
habituating, often resulting in an amotivational syndrome" [40]. 
To an extent, the Killer Weed image was replaced by the belief that mari- 
huana was not an especially dangerous drug in any respect. For many, 
though, what changed was not the degree of danger, but the kind. The most 
common claim now was that marihuana use destroyed ambition and initia- 
tive, undermined the effort to cope with the world, and facilitated with- 
drawal fl'om reality. It led, in the National Commission's words to "lethargy, 
instability, social deterioration, a loss of interest in virtually all activities 
other than drug use" [41]. Marihuana, in other words, destroyed the struc- 
tured, active, achieving, outgoing part of the personality and thus uncovered 
the essentially passive, ambitionless, solipsistic human nature hidden under- 
neath. It was now a Drop-out Drug; it caused a failure ofachievernent, or in 
common parlance, an arnotivational syndrome. Like the Killer Weed, the 
Drop-out Drug in effect destroyed the user's self-control and released the 
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basically anti-social human nature held in check by it. The difference lay in 
how this underlying human nature was pictured: aggressive in the one case, 
passive and ambitionless in the other. 
Although it had received scant attention prior to the 1960s, the passivity 
claim was the most common danger attributed to marihuana by the articles 
in the Readers' Guide sample between 1964 and 1976, being mentioned by 
35% of the articles (to be sure, not a majority). More importantly, the claim 
dominated judicial deliberations, Congressional hearings, and federal reports. 
In his landmark 1967 decision upholding the constitutionality of  Massa- 
chusetts' marihuana law, Judge G. Joseph Tauro described marihuana use as 
follows: 
Many succumb to the  drug as a handy  means  o f  withdrawing f rom the inevitable stresses and legiti- 
mate  demands  o f  society. The evasion of  problems and escape from reality seem to be among the  
desired effects of  the  use o f  mari juana [42] .  
The charge of passivity and withdrawal was first voiced in Congressional 
hearings in 1968 by Dr. Donald Louria, of the New York State Council on 
Drug Addiction: 
Drug-induced withdrawal is a problem of  increasing severity in our society, and LSD is only one 
vehicle for this. Even mar ihuana  in heavy doses can, after repeated use, produce the  same loss o f  
ambit ion,  rejection of  previously established goals, and retreat into a solipsistic, drug-oriented 
cocoon [43] .  
In the 1969-1970 hearings on the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention 
and Control Act, the amotivational syndrome was the major claim made 
against marihuana, being mentioned in eight of the eleven major pieces of 
testimony that discussed adverse effects [441. It was, moreover, the only 
danger that was stressed or discussed at length. For example, Roger Egeberg, 
Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs in the Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare, made the following point: 
Marihuana use, particularly because it starts at such an early age, is apt  to make  m a n y  people go 
off  into a pleasant euphoria  or other  means  of  evading reality at a t ime,  15, 16, 17, 18 years when  
they should be setting their a i m s . . .  This I would  say is the tragedy to all o f  society with respect 
to the use o f  marihuana [45] .  (emphasis added) 
Dana Farnsworth of the Harvard University Health Services also focused on 
the amotivational syndrome: 
But  I am very much concerned about  what has come to be called the 'amotivational syndrome' .  I 
am certain as I can be . . . tha t  when  an individual becomes  dependent  upon  m a r i h u a n a . . ,  he  
becomes  preoccupied with it. His a t t i tude changes toward endorsement  o f  values which he  had 
no t  before;  he  tends  to become  very easily satisfied with what  is immediately present ,  in such a 
way tha t  he  seems to have been robbed of  his ability to make  appropriate choices [46] .  (emphasis  
added) 
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The 1972 report of  the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug 
Abuse took the ".amotivational syndrome" more seriously than any other 
potential adverse effect o f  marihuana. While downplaying most of  the com- 
monly claimed dangers and giving moderate use a clean bill of  health, the 
report was careful to stress that the amotivational syndrome was a real 
danger for heavy users and might become a major problem in the United 
States as use increased. More importantly,  the National Commission noted a 
pervasive societal concern about  an amotivational syndrome. In discussing 
"why society feels threatened," the report noted that parents were 
concerned that "marihuana will undermine or interfere with academic and 
vocational career development and achievement" or, even worse, that it will 
lead to "amotivat ion" and "dropping out"  [47].  
Senator Eastland's 1974 hearings pictured the amotivational syndrome as 
the most significant behavioral effect of  marihuana use: 
The most notable and consistent clinical changes that have been reported in heavy marihuana 
smokers include apathy approaehi.~ indolence, lack of m o t i v a t i o n . . ,  reduced interest in sociali- 
zing, and attraction to intense sensory stimuli . . . .  Possibly the issue of greatest importance in the 
area of behavioral toxicity of marihuana is the question of the amotivational syndrome [48]. 
The amotivational syndrome was mentioned by twelve of  the fourteen wit- 
nesses who testified on the behavioral effects of  marihuana - several times as 
often as any other adverse effect, and it was the only behavioral effect to 
be systematically discussed - by Harvey Powelson, Hardin Jones, and Harold 
Kolansky and William Moore [49].  
Beyond its mere quantitative frequency, the amotivational syndrome also 
provided a frame for discussing the other adverse effects of  marihuana and 
for constructing an image of  the user as a person. I t . thus played the same 
pivotal cognitive role that violence did in the 1930s. Psychological depen- 
dence, the second most frequently mentioned adverse effect in the 1960s 
and early 1970s, was basically a synonym for the amotivational syndrome; 
both claims implied that the heavy marihuana user became totally wrapped 
up in drug use and lost interest in everything else. The brain damage and 
lowered testosterone levels (in males) caused by marihuana use were partly 
interpreted as the direct causes of  the amotivational syndrome. The former 
was said to limit the user's cognitive ability to deal with the world, and the 
latter to lead to a general reduction in drive [5] .  The putative link 
between marihuana use and automobile accidents was understood to result 
from the user's reduced ability to cope with the world. 
Those who sought to typify marihuana users implicitly described them as 
embodiments  of  the amotivational syndrome. Passivity, lack of  motivation, 
withdrawal from reality, and an inability to cope were not  seen as some 
30 
of the user's many traits, but as master traits that defined his very existence. 
In Judge Tauro's adjectival overkill, marihuana users were-"the disaffiliated, 
the neurotic and psychotic, the confused, the anxious, the alienated, the 
inadequate, the weak" [51 ]. For Hardin Jones, the amotivational syndrome 
was nothing less than a whole lifestyle of "dropping out, indolence, lowering 
of goals, alienation" and "kookiness" [ 52]. 
In short, the amotivational syndrome was not simply one important effect 
imputed to marihuana; it formed the core of the dominant image of both 
drug and user. Marihuana did not simply cause an amotivational syndrome 
(among other things); it was in essence a Drop-out Drug. The rise of the 
Drop-out Drug image can be seen as the result of the demise of the FBN's 
dominance of public discussion, the increase in middle-class use, and the 
emergence of marihuana as a symbol of the Counterculture. 
DEMISE OF THE BUREAU'S HEGEMONY 
The shift from Killer Weed to Drop-out Drug resulted in part from the 
decline of the monopoly of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics over the 
marihuana issue. In the early 1960s, President Kennedy initiated a series of 
White House conferences, panels, and commissions on "narcotics and drug 
abuse" that effectively opened up the discussion of marihuana to other 
government agencies and interested groups [53]. Later in the decade, the 
rapid increase in marihuana use made the drug a major social issue for the 
first time - the subject of widespread popular debate, headlines, and endless 
hearings and reports. 
The basis of the Bureau's dominance of the marihuana issue was thus 
undermined. Marihuana became an important matter; other interested 
groups (notably scientists, physicians, and public health officials) became 
involved; users themselves became a force in their own right; and the general 
populace was aroused. What had once been a small-scale, uninterrupted 
monologue became a wide-ranging, raucous cacophony of voices, and 
narcotics officials could not hope to dominate a public discussion of such 
scale and diversity. The main proponent of the Killer Weed image thus lost 
ground, while the very diversity of voices created the opportunity for a new 
image of marihuana to emerge. As changes in the social locus of use and the 
symbolic meaning of the drug generated a Drop-out Drug image, there were 
spokesmen (primarily public health officials and physicians) available to 
publicize and legitimate it. 
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MIDDLE-CLASS DEVIANCE 
The emergence of  youthful  middle-class marihuana users also led to the 
rise of  the Drop-out Drug image. In the 1920s and 1930s, when Mexican 
laborers and other lower-strata groups had been perceived as the primary 
users of  marihuana, the drug had been seen as creating the kind of  deviant 
behavior regarded as typical of  those groups - aggression or a failure of  
restraint. In the 1960s, marihuana use among middle-class youth  increased 
rapidly and was quickly recognized; the first articles announcing the in- 
crease of  marihuana use in suburbs and on campus began appearing in 1964 
and 1965 [54].  The typical using group thus became middle-class youth.  If  
violence was the kind of  deviance expected from lower-strata groups, then a 
failure to achieve, a loss of  motivation and initiative, appeared as the typical 
way that middle-class kids went bad and as the ultimate failure of  middle- 
class socialization. They were expected not to commit violent crimes or go 
insane in any spectacular way but  rather to drop out or squander their 
potential. The dangers attributed to marihuana changed accordingly from 
the deviance expected from the older using group to that expected from the 
newer group - from violence to amotivation or a failure of  achievement. 
MARIHUANA AND THE COUNTERCULTURE 
Finally, the image of  marihuana changed because the drug became a 
symbol in the wider social struggle between the dominant society and the 
Counterculture. As used here, "Countercul ture" refers to the political and 
cultural rebellion of  middle-class youth  during the late 1960s and early 
1970s as well as to those who participated in this rebellion in its widest 
sense - not  only those who became involved in radical politics or experi- 
mented with alternative lifestyles but also the much larger number  who 
shared the sense of  alienation and the value commitments  that fostered these 
activities. 
"Symbol"  implies something that not only refers to but  also embodies 
something else and thus is responded to as if it were that other thing; in 
other words, a symbol invokes in us the same experience as the object it 
symbolizes. As Jaeger and Selznick put  it: 
the  symbol  itself takes on the h u m a n  significance possessed by its referent. To the  naturalist,  the 
flock o f  birds may  be a sign o f  land, and nothing more. To the sailor long at sea, the  flock of  birds 
may  acquire symbolic s tatus and he may  respond to them much  as he will later respond to his 
actual homecoming.  Black may  be merely a denotative sign o f  death,  death merely a natural  sign o f  
disease. But when black is truly a symbol  o f  death,  we respond to it much  as we would human ly  
respond in the  presence of  death [55] .  
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For many in the late 1960s and early 1970s, marihuana not only was as- 
sociated with the Counterculture but  also came to embody it. They 
responded to the one as if it were the other. 
The symbolic status of  marihuana was occasionally directly acknowledged 
in public discussion, and an effort was sometimes made to distinguish the 
drug's effects from its meaning. In a 1972 National Review article, for 
example, Jeffrey Hart argued that the evils of  marihuana lay in its meaning, 
not  its effects ("I care not a fig for its physical effects"):  marihuana 
symbolized the Counterculture,  and the main purpose of  anti-marihuana 
laws was " to  lean on, to penalize the counterculture" [56] .  For their part, 
proponents  of  penalty reduction took pains to argue that marihuana should 
not be regarded as anything more than a drug. The National Commission 
explicitly "tried to desymbolize" marihuana so as to build support  for 
decriminalization [57] .  Several studies of  the uproar over marihuana in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s also a t tempted to root  opposit ion to the drug 
in its symbolic meaning as distinct from its effects [58] .  
Public discussion of  marihuana, however, rarely drew such a neat distinc- 
tion between meaning and effects, and the most  significant consequence of  
the transformation of  marihuana into a symbol lay in the ways the effects 
themselves were reconceptualized. When these effects were discussed, they 
were described in a way determined by  the fact that marihuana was the 
symbolic embodiment  of  the Counterculture. The social characteristics of  
the Counterculture,  as perceived by the dominant society, were projected 
onto marihuana and then said to be psychological effects inherent in the 
drug; because the Counterculture was characterized as passive and escapist, 
marihuana became seen as a producer of  passivity and escape on the 
individual level. The alnotivational syndrome, in other w o r d s  was simply 
tile Counterculture writ small and turned into a psychiatric diagnosis. 
Once established, the new image of  marihuana persisted because it was 
functional; it reinforced a way of  explaining the Counterculture that was 
simultaneously a way of  explaining it away, of  accounting for it without 
having to come to terms with it. The easiest way to condemn youthful  
rebellion was to describe it in purely negative terms - as dropping out from 
organized social life, as escaping from reality, as failure. In this way, the 
adult generation and the dominant society did not  have to acknowledge and 
deal with what you th  were doing but  only with what youth  were not doing. 
They did not  have to confront  the youthful  rebels' philosophical, moral, and 
political commitments  or the alternative world that they were trying to 
build, in however halting, half-hearted, and incomplete a way. The image of  
marihuana as a source of  an amotivational syndrome facilitated this purely 
negative viewing of  the Counterculture,  because, if the amotivational syn- 
drome was simply the Counterculture writ small, the Counterculture in turn 
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could be seen simply as the amotivational syndrome writ large. The amotiva- 
tional syndrome provided a seemingly simple, delimited model on the 
psychological level for understanding a more complex, diffuse, and thus 
harder-to-grasp phenomenon on the cultural level. 
Contemplated in itself, the Counterculture might have been too complex 
to support  a simple image of  it as a mere negation or dropping out. Viewed 
as a giant version of  the amotivational syndrome, it was easier to understand 
and dismiss. The assessment of  the amotivational syndrome was unassailable; 
it was unambiguously negative - loss of  motivation, escape from reality, 
passivity. As a syndrome, moreover, it was a psychiatric condition with 
clear overtones of  pathology. As the amotivational syndrome writ large, 
the Counterculture too appeared as unquestionably negative, and its 
negativity appeared as something specific and palpable - a mass psychiatric 
syndrome. The discrediting view of  the Counterculture was thus reinforced 
by its association with marihuana conceived as the source of  the amotiva- 
tional syndrome. 
To restate this in a sentence: marihuana simply functioned effectively as a 
cultural symbol. It provided a " template"  for organizing and making sense of  
a multi tude of  impressions of the Counterculture - to use Geertz's 
terminology. It served as a "sensuous embodiment  of  what is abstract and 
ineffable" - to use Jaeger's and Selznick's phrase [59].  
The public images of  drug and culture, in short, were mutually 
reinforcing. Because its use symbolized a cultural phenomenon that was 
widely seen as a mere passive withdrawal from reality, marihuana ceased to 
be seen primarily as a Killer Weed and became instead a Drop-out Drug. 
Because the Counterculture was symbolized by a Drop-out Drug, its reputa- 
tion as a pathological denial of  society was made palpable and thus 
reinforced. 
SUMMARY 
In short, the shift from Killer Weed to Drop-out Drug occurred for three 
reasons. First, the main proponent  of  the Killer Weed image, the Federal 
Bureau of  Narcotics, lost its dominance of  the public discussion of  
marihuana, and the subsequent plurality of  voices allowed a new image to 
emerge. Second, the social locus of  use changed; middle-class youth  became 
seen as the primary users of  marihuana, and the image of  marihuana changed 
to reflect the typical kind of  deviance expected of  this group. Finally , 
marihuana became involved in the cultural and political conflict of  the late 
1960s and early 1970s as a symbol of  the Counterculture and thus became 
an embodiment  of  the latter. 
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Like the Killer Weed image, the Drop-out Drug image became prominent 
without any really compelling evidence in its favor. At the 1974 Senate 
Judiciary Committee Hearings, for example, the argument that marihuana 
caused an amotivational syndrome was based solely on case studies drawn 
from clinical populations. Most of it was a trifle unsystematic. Several 
witnesses referred to their clinical experience in an offhand, anecdotal way. 
Another, a medical physicist with no psychiatric training, claimed to have 
interviewed some 1,600 marihuana users and to have seen "some degree of 
amotivational syndrome in all of  them." tte mentioned no control group, 
however, nor did he specify the composition and source of his sample, the 
nature and extent of the interviews, or the criteria used to identify the 
amotivational syndrome. The only other data was supplied by two 
psychiatrists who claimed that the 38 marihuana users they had seen in their 
private practices exhibited a distinctive amotivational syndrome that dis- 
appeared when use was discontinued. Their study, however, provided no 
basis for inferring the prevalence of an amotivational syndrome among the 
general population of marihuana users. 
Conclusion 
The evils attributed to marihuana use in the United States changed radical- 
ly in the mid-1960s. Prior to that time, marihuana use was said to produce 
violence and aggression; since then, it has been said to cause virtually the op- 
posite, passivity and amotivation. This transformation from Killer Weed to 
Drop-out Drug involved a change not only in specific beliefs about the 
effects of marihuana use but also in the general images of the drug and its 
users. What changed, in other words, were the basic assumptions underlying 
the entire public discussion of marihuana. 
The shift can be explained by situating the public discussion of marihuana 
in social context. In particular, we have attempted to link it logically and 
historically to changes in (1) the array of organized social actors in the drug 
control arena; (2) the social background of marihuana users; and (3) the role 
of marihuana as a symbol in wider social conflicts. The importance of these 
factors in explaining the changed image of marihuana reaffirms the value of 
the guiding concepts upon which they were based and which in turn were 
extracted from the sociological literature on drug controls - entrepreneur- 
ship, social locus, and symbolic politics. 
More generally, the analysis set out here suggests that the beliefs which 
prevail in public discussion of a particular kind of behavior depend upon (1) 
what organized social actors are available to give a specific set of beliefs 
legitimacy and credibility; (2) what social groups are identified with the 
behavior and what the prevailing stereotypes about those groups are; and (3) 
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what the symbolic content (if any) of  the behavior is. The beliefs that are 
likely to prevail are those which are advocated by the dominant organized 
actors in a particular arena of public discussion, those which are consistent 
with the general stereotypes aboat the social groups associated with the 
behavior in question, and those which are consistent with whatever symbolic 
meaning the behavior has. 
Finally, our sociological account of  the radical shift from Killer Weed to 
Drop-out Drug does not suggest that either of these images is necessarily 
false. Explaining a belief sociologically does not in itself invalidate it (and, 
conversely, not onlyfa lse  beliefs require sociological explanation). The 
analysis presented here, however, does imply that it is either false or mislead- 
ing to regard truth-value or perceived truth-value as the crucial factor in the 
public acceptance of  a belief. It also implies that even the most basic, taken- 
for-granted beliefs may be both historically variable and socially 
conditioned. 
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